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SENTIMENTS AND RATIONALIZABILITY
LAURENT MATHEVET
Abstract. Sentiments are characteristics of players’ beliefs. I propose two notions of sentiments,
confidence and optimism, and I study their role in shaping the set of rationalizable strategy profiles
in (incomplete information) games with complementarities. Confidence is related to a player’s
perceived precision of information; optimism is the sentiment that the outcome of the game will be
“favorable.” I prove two main results on how sentiments and payoffs interact to determine the size
and location of the set of rationalizable profiles. The first result provides an explicit upper bound
on the size of the set of rationalizable strategy profiles, relating complementarities and confidence;
the second gives an explicit lower bound on the change of location, relating complementarities and
optimism. I apply these results to four areas. In models of currency crisis (Morris and Shin [16]),
the results suggest that the most confident investors may drive financial markets. In models of
empirical industrial organization (Aradillas-Lopez [2]), the paper provides a classification of the
parameter values for which the model is identified. In non-Bayesian updating (Epstein [7]), the
results clarify the strategic implications of certain biases. Finally, the results generalize and clarify
the uniqueness result of global games (Carlsson and van Damme [4] and Frankel et al. [10]).
1. Introduction
In all social or economic interactions, whether they take place in financial markets, in elections or
joint-ventures, the beliefs of the actors contribute to shape the set of possible outcomes. Bank runs
are often caused by shifts of agents’ beliefs which are unrelated to the real economy (Diamond and
Dybvig [6]). In financial markets, the trading volume of investors with brokerage accounts is exces-
sive compared to rational wisdom (Odean [21], [22]). And more than fifty thousand corporations
are established every month, despite the combination of having much to lose and the seemingly
low chance of success (Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg [5]). For the game-theorist, the richness of
outcomes appears in the set of rationalizable strategy profiles. If there are many such profiles, far
apart from one another, then very different outcomes may ensue. Similarly, the set of rationalizable
strategy profiles may be narrow, but if its location within the set of all profiles is unknown, or if it
changes in time or across populations, then very different outcomes may also ensue.
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I propose two notions of sentiments, confidence and optimism, which are characteristics of players’
beliefs, and I study their role in rationalizability for games with complementarities. The paper
contains two main results. The first result provides an explicit upper bound on the distance
between any two rationalizable profiles, relating complementarities and confidence. The more
confident the players are, the smaller that distance is. Naive intuition suggests that a “confident
player” is, by definition, not influenced by others’ actions; instead such a player makes his own
choices regardless of the actions of others, and this intuitively favors equilibrium uniqueness and
tight sets of rationalizable strategies. While this naive explanation is misleading, a confident player,
as defined in the paper, will act as if he were not affected much by others’ strategies. The second
result provides a lower bound on the amount by which the rationalizable profiles increase after
optimism increases. As a player becomes more optimistic, he is willing to choose actions that he
were previously not willing to take. This causes a shift in the set of rationalizable strategy profiles.
Optimism thus contributes to locating the set of rationalizable strategy profiles.
The main advantage of this approach is that sentiments are primitive objects which do not specify
the origin of the beliefs. Belief formation is completely general. Players need not share a common
prior; they can have heterogenous beliefs. This seems natural in financial markets where traders
can have priors with different means (Varian [26]). Moreover, players need not even be Bayesian;
they can have systematic biases, such as a prior or an overreaction bias (Epstein [7]).
I first describe the model in order to define sentiments. The model is a family of games with
incomplete information. Players have types, which are either payoff-relevant, or informative about
the state of nature which is payoff-relevant. The state of nature represents the physical reality, such
as the weakness of a currency or the fundamentals of the economy. Players can take one of finitely
many ordered actions. They only care about an aggregate, i.e. a summary statistic, of what their
opponents are doing. This aggregate could be the average action of the opponents, the proportion
of opponents playing some action, or other statistics. Players do not know the types of their
opponents, and they may not know the state of nature. Based on their information, they formulate
beliefs about the state and about their opponents’ types. With their beliefs, they can assess the
distribution of the aggregate. The games under consideration are games with complementarities.
Each player wants to play larger actions when others do so as well, and/or when the state of nature
or their type increases. Finally, these games admit dominance regions, which are “tail regions” of
the state space for which the extremal actions are strictly dominant.
I now define confidence and optimism. Confidence is the sentiment that one has faith in one’s
information or abilities. In games of incomplete information, it is natural to interpret confidence as
a precision-related concept. The notion that I adopt is related to the perceived precision of one’s
information (see Section 2). Since each player has two types of beliefs, about the state and about
others’ types, confidence will have two dimensions. The first dimension, called state confidence,
measures the perceived precision of types in regards to the state. When a player’s type increases,
by how much does he think the state will increase on average? The answer is state confidence and
it measures how good the player thinks his type is at reproducing changes in the state. A confident
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player thinks that his type “picks up” the right magnitude of shifts, so state confidence should be
relatively large. The second dimension, called aggregate confidence, measures the perceived precision
of a player’s type in regards to others’ types. The player considers a hypothetical situation with
counterfactual information: His opponents decrease their strategies but simultaneously his type
increases. By how much does the player think the aggregate will decrease on average? The answer
is aggregate confidence and it gives the counterfactual information which receives more weight;
as such it is an indicator of confidence (in one’s type). In the counterfactuals, the first piece of
information is bad news, because the aggregate should decrease on average. The second piece of
information is good news, because others should receive larger types as well, hence play larger
actions. A player who displays full aggregate confidence follows his information and answers zero
to the question. In general, the smaller the answer, the larger aggregate confidence.
Under incomplete information, optimism measures how favorable a player expects the outcome
to be. By convention, an outcome is said to be more favorable if it is larger.1 From a player’s
perspective, the outcome becomes more favorable when the aggregate and the state are larger,
because of the complementarities. Optimism also has two dimensions. For state beliefs, a player
becomes more optimistic if, with the same informational type, he now believes larger states are
more likely. The change in optimism is measured by the amplitude of his belief shift. For many
distributions, this is equivalent to asking the player how much he expects the state to change on
average.2 The other dimension of optimism is the change in the expected aggregate forecasted by
a player with the same informational type.
As mentioned before, the paper contains two main results. In games with strategic complemen-
tarities, there exist a largest and a smallest rationalizable strategy profile (Milgrom and Roberts
[15]), and the distance between them gives the size of the set of rationalizable strategy profiles.
The first result provides an upper bound on the size of the set of rationalizable profiles; this
upper bound relates complementarities and confidence. The lessons for comparative statics are
enlightening. The set of rationalizable strategy profiles tends to shrink as players become more
confident. This fact is strong because it holds across belief structures. In particular, it implies that
if players are fully confident, then there is a unique rationalizable profile. Further, rationalizable
profiles tend to get closer when payoffs become more sensitive to the state. Finally, rationalizable
profiles tend to get further apart when strategic complementarities become stronger.
The explanation behind the result is intuitive. A confident player follows his information, hence
his course of actions, even when his opponents modify their strategies, because he does not ex-
pect the aggregate action to change much if his type compensates for it. This favors uniqueness.
However, the beliefs of a poorly confident player are easily swayed by others’ strategies. This gives
bite to the complementarities, and favors multiplicity. The payoff incentives are also quite clear.
On the one hand, as players become more sensitive to the state, they become more sensitive to
1Recall that actions are ordered, so outcomes/profiles can be ranked accordingly. That larger outcomes are “better”
or more favorable is not an objective statement. Sometimes the difference between optimism and pessimism is a bit
vague, depending on the interpretation.
2This is true for all location-scale families.
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variation in their private information. A variation in type induces a more or less drastic change in
actions, regardless of what others are doing. This favors uniqueness. On the other hand, strategic
complementarities create interdependence, and favor multiplicity.
The second result provides an explicit lower bound on the amount by which the extremal ratio-
nalizable profiles must vary after optimism increases; this lower bound relates complementarities
and optimism. As optimism increases, it follows from Milgrom and Roberts [15] that the set of
rationalizable profiles moves up. This paper is concerned with the amplitude of this change in
location, because this will say, for instance, how much more likely a currency attack or a bank run
should be. When a player becomes more optimistic, he is willing to play larger actions at lower
types. But “how low” is he willing to go? To answer, the information of the optimistic player
is worsened up to the point where he is indifferent again. The comparative statics lessons are
insightful. Everything else equal, if players become more optimistic and/or less confident, then the
minimal amount by which the extremal rationalizable profiles must rise increases. This is because
good news becomes better and better news. Interestingly, confidence also comes into play. If a
player is poorly confident, hence believes his information is not precise, then as he becomes more
optimistic, it takes very low types to convince him that his optimism was unfounded. So, the
change in location is larger for lower confidence levels.
The results are particularly interesting in four areas: Financial markets, empirical industrial
organization, non-Bayesian updating, and global games.
This paper suggests that financial markets may be driven by the most confident investors in the
sense that small changes in their strategies lead to larger changes in the strategies of the poorly
confident investors. The results cover the case of asymmetric confidence levels across players, in
which case multiplicity may reappear as groups of investors become less confident. Why? Poorly
confident investors have beliefs which are relatively insensitive to their type, yet their beliefs must
change across the multiple rationalizable profiles, for otherwise they would not change their in-
vestment strategies. Therefore, the strategies of others must have swayed their beliefs. I illustrate
these ideas in Section 6.1 in the currency crisis model of Morris and Shin [16].
In econometric models of empirical industrial organization, the results can provide a classification
of the parameter values for which the model is identified. A recent literature in empirical industrial
organization aims to estimate models with incomplete information. The econometrician is assumed
to know the family of joint-distributions of the noise variables. But there is no common prior or
Bayesian assumption. The econometrician assumes, however, that the data he observes come from
a unique equilibrium. In Section 6.2, I illustrate how my results can be used for identification
purposes in a simplified version of Aradillas-Lopez [2]’s model.
This paper also sheds some light on the strategic implications of non-Bayesian updating. Epstein
[7] reports several updating biases and provides an axiomatic model. While it is beyond the scope
of this paper to offer a comprehensive treatment, I consider two biases, the prior bias and the
overreaction bias, and I study their impact on rationalizability in games with complementarities
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(Section 6.3). The prior bias lowers confidence, while the overreaction bias magnifies it. Therefore,
the former favors multiplicity, and the latter uniqueness.
This paper generalizes and clarifies the traditional global games uniqueness results (Carlsson and
van Damme [4], Frankel, Morris and pauzner [10], Morris and Shin [18]).3 The generalization comes
from the fact that players need not share a common prior. Players in global games become fully
confident and this implies that there is a unique rationalizable profile (Section 4.2.2).4 The expla-
nation offered in Mathevet [14] is explicit here: The global game information structure dampens
the complementarities to the point where uniqueness is obtained. The paper is also part of a recent
effort, started by Morris and Shin [19] and Izmalkov and Yildiz [12], to understand rationalizability
beyond the common prior assumption. Morris and Shin [19] revisits the belief foundations of global
games in a general class of binary-action games with virtually no modeling assumptions. They
provide different sets of conditions on beliefs which ensure uniqueness, or even characterize ratio-
nalizability. Izmalkov and Yildiz [12] introduces sentiments into the study of global games. They
define notions of optimism, and they analyze partnership games and games of currency crisis. In
two-player games, their notion of optimism is the probability with which a player believes that his
opponent receives a higher type than his. They are able to fully characterize the unique equilibrium
in terms of optimism. In Section 4.2.1, I explain the relationship between my results and Izmalkov
and Yildiz [12] in the context of partnership games.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. There are four major sections. The first
one illustrates the main concepts. The following section presents the model and the assumptions.
The third section formally defines confidence and optimism and it contains all the results. The last
section applies the results to currency crises, empirical industrial organization, and non-Bayesian
updating.
2. The Intuition Behind Confidence and Optimism
A simple global game example is helpful to derive natural notions of confidence and optimism.
The general definitions will be substantial extensions of these ideas. The example will also bring
out “stylized” facts which will prove to be general comparative statics results.
Consider the following investment game (Morris and Shin [18]). Two players are deciding whether
to invest (1) or not (0). Each player receives a net profit that depends on the action profile and on
the fundamental of the economy θ ∈ R.
1 0
1 θ, θ θ − 1, 0
0 0, θ − 1 0, 0
Players share a common prior about θ which is a normal distribution with mean y and standard
3It is important to note that the traditional global game results hold for compact action spaces and non-aggregative
games.
4It is not trivial to show that players become fully confident, because this convergence has to be uniform in type
and strategies.
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deviation τ . Each player i receives a linear type ti = θ + i about the state, where i is normally
distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation ν. Assume that each i is independently distributed
from j (j 6= i) and θ.
Upon receiving his type ti, player i formulates beliefs about the state and about the other player’s
type. Following Morris and Shin [18], i’s posterior beliefs about θ is a normal distribution with
mean µ = (ν2y + τ2ti)/(ν2 + τ2) and standard deviation
√
ν2τ2/(ν2 + τ2). His posterior beliefs
about j’s type are also normal, with mean µ and standard deviation
√
(2ν2τ2 + ν4)/(ν2 + τ2).
In this context, it is natural to say that a player is confident if ν is small, because his type
becomes a perfect predictor of the state and of his opponent’s type. Indeed, if ν is small then
µ ≈ ti and both standard deviations are nearly zero. It is also natural to say that a player becomes
more optimistic if y increases, because both the prior and the posterior beliefs increase in y with
respect to first-order stochastic dominance. Better fundamentals and larger types are expected.
Morris and Shin [18] offer a detailed account of equilibrium multiplicity. They derive an equation
whose zeroes correspond to symmetric equilibria, as shown in Figure 1. Each intersection with the
x-axis is a symmetric equilibrium cutoff type. For example, if the intersection occurs at 1/2, then
it means that the strategies that consist in playing 0 below type 1/2 and 1 above form a symmetric
equilibrium. Each panel is associated with its own level ν. The right panel has a smaller ν than the
left one. In each panel, the lower curve correspond to prior mean y and the upper curve corresponds
to a more optimistic situation y′ > y.
Three facts appear in Figure 1. First, it seems that the set of rationalizable strategy profiles
shrink as ν → 0, that is, as players become more confident. This is part of the well-known global
games result, where uniqueness is obtained for small ν (Carlsson and van Damme [4], Frankel,
Morris and pauzner [10], Morris and Shin [18]). Second, as players become more optimistic, they
invest earlier. This also appears in the picture since the extremal intersections occur earlier for the
upper curve. Third, as players become more confident (ν → 0), the positive effect of optimism on
investment becomes weaker; when ν is very small, increasing y seems to have no effect.
The global game analysis implicitly assumes that there is common knowledge of the linear sig-
naling functions. So there is a sense in which ν could be some objective noise in everyone’s type.
In general, however, it could be that a player only knows his own signaling function, believes it
has noise νi, and believes others have different noises νj . In this case, it seems appropriate to talk
about the player’s perceived precision. Even more generally, players may not have linear signaling
functions, they may not share a common prior, and they may not even be Bayesian statisticians.
What are the relevant definitions of confidence and optimism in the general case? Are the effects
of confidence and optimism preserved in general?
It is worth mentioning that the general definition of confidence is not a trivial extension of the
above. The reason is that the above argument confuses reliability and precision. It is well-known
that there is a unique equilibrium when the prior is uniform (Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner [10]),
regardless of the noise level ν. Thus confidence ought to capture this aspect as well.
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Figure 1. (L) Multiplicity and Large Upward-Shift, and (R) Uniqueness and Small
Updward-Shift.
Among the many ways of formalizing confidence, the relevant notion will measure the perceived
content of informational change. Healy and Moore [11] reports several definitions from the psychol-
ogy and finance literature. Some are related to the estimation, or ranking, of one’s own performance
compared to others’ (Erev, Wallsten, and Budescu [8]), and other definitions are related to the per-
ceived precision of one’s information. Odean ([21], [22]) studies trading in retail brokerage accounts
and makes a strong case for the latter. He reports studies of the calibration of subjective prob-
abilities where people tend to overestimate the precision of their knowledge (Alpert and Raiffa
[1], Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein [9]). Investment bankers (von Holstein and Carl-Axel [28]),
engineers (Kidd [13]), entrepreneurs (Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg [5]), lawyers (Wagenaar and
Keren [29]), negotiators (Neale and Bazerman [20]), and managers (Russo and Schoemaker [23])
have all been observed to exhibit overconfidence in their judgements. In most existing works, pre-
cision is understood as reliability. Usually, a confident player is one who believes his information
has a smaller variance than what it actually does. In Odean ([21], [22]) the concept is comparative,
because it also includes the player’s perception of his opponents’ variances. The present definition
is related to these concepts. For example, if a player thinks the variance of his type is lower than
what it actually is, then he will display state overconfidence.
3. The Model
The model is described by the following game with incomplete information. The set and the
number of players is N <∞.5 The set of types of player i is Ti = R with generic element ti. Denote
T−i = Rn−1. Player i’s action set is a finite and linearly ordered set Ai = {ai,1, . . . , ai,Mi}, where
5The paper and its results can be extended to N =∞, as in Section 6.1.
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the actions are indexed in increasing order. Let A−i =
∏
i 6=iAj . The payoff function of player i,
denoted ui, will be defined later.
A strategy for player i is a measurable function from Ti into Ai. In the class of games to be
studied, only strategies which are monotone in a player’s type will be relevant. Given the finite
number of actions, those strategies are step functions, which are fully characterized by their cutoffs.
Thus, any (monotone) strategy is representable by a vector (of cutoffs) in RMi−1. Without loss
of generality, let Si ⊂ RMi−1 denote the compact set of (monotone) strategies for player i. Let
S =
∏
i Si denote the set of strategy profiles and let S−i =
∏
j 6=i Sj denote the profiles of strategies
for players other than i.
3.1. The Payoffs: Aggregation and Complementarities. There is a state of nature repre-
sented by a variable θ ∈ R. In a currency crisis model, θ represents the weakness of the currency.
In other models, this variable represents the strength of the fundamentals of the economy. Each
player i only cares about an aggregate Γi of his opponents’ actions. This aggregate is an increasing
and non-constant function, which maps action profiles and states (or types) from A−i × R onto a
linearly ordered set Gi. For example, a player could care about the sum of her opponents’ actions,
or about the proportion of her opponents playing more than some threshold which depends on the
state.6 Each player i’s utility is assumed to depend only on the state, ui(ai,Γi(a−i, θ), θ), or only
on the player’s own type, ui(ai,Γi(a−i), ti). That is, the payoff structure includes common values
and private values, but no mixtures of the two.
The utility functions are subject to the following assumptions.
3.1.1. The Assumptions. Let X and T be lattices (see Topkis). A function f : X × T → R
has (strictly) increasing differences in (x, t) if for all x′ > x and t′ > t, f(x′, t′) − f(x, t′) (>) ≥
f(x′, t) − f(x, t). To avoid redundancy, the assumptions are given for the common values, but
they identically translate to private values by replacing θ with the player’s type. Player i’s utility
function has increasing differences in (ai, a−i) for each θ, and strictly increasing differences in (ai, θ)
for each a−i.7 For each profile a, i’s utility function is bounded on compact sets of states θ. Finally,
there are dominance regions: There exist states θ and θ such that for states above θ, it is a strictly
dominant strategy for each player to play his largest action, and for states below θ, it is a strictly
dominant strategy for each player to play his smallest action.
The first condition introduces strategic complementarities, by which a player wants to increase
his action when others do so as well. The second requirement introduces state monotonicity, by
which a player wants to increase his action when the state is larger. The third is a technical
condition, and the last one imposes dominance regions.
6In these cases, write Γi(a−i, θ) =
P
j 6=i aj and Γi(a−i, θ) = (
P
j 6=i 1aj≥a∗(θ))/(N − 1).
7There are applications where these assumptions can be weakened. For example, if there exists a value γ′ of Γi
which always occurs with strictly positive probability (in equilibrium), then it is sufficient for ui(ai, γ
′, θ) to have
strictly increasing differences in (ai, θ) (see Section 6.1).
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The applied literature is replete with games that satisfy these conditions. In currency crisis
models (Morris and Shin [16]), speculators have to decide whether or not to attack a currency. Each
speculator only cares about the proportion of people who attack. If there are enough speculators
who attack, the currency is devaluated. The dominance regions correspond to regions where the
currency is so weak, or so strong, that a particular action is strictly dominant. The bank run model
of Morris and Shin [17] satisfies these assumptions, as well as the investment game of Carlsson and
van Damme [4] and the model of merger waves of Toxvaerd [24]. There are voting situations and
search models which fit into the framework. In a search model, agents only care about the sum
of the effort of their potential partners. The more people search, the more an agent wants to
search. If the probability to find a partner is non-zero, even if a single agent searches, as long as
he puts maximal effort, and if the search cost increases very slowly for large types, then there will
be dominance regions. Finally, a recent literature in empirical industrial organization estimates
models that satisfy these assumptions (Aradillas-Lopez [2]. See Section 6.2).
3.2. Beliefs and Aggregate Distribution. A player formulates type-dependent beliefs about
the state of nature and his opponents’ types. Decompose these beliefs into two parts. First,
player i’s type-dependent beliefs about the state of nature, called state beliefs, are represented by
a distribution function Fi(·|ti) with density function fi(θ|ti). Second, player i formulates beliefs,
which for each type and state of nature, assigns a probability measure on T−i. These beliefs are
represented by µi : Ti × R→M−i where M−i is the set of all probability measures on T−i.
Under private values, there is no state of nature, and de facto no state beliefs. But this case is
technically equivalent to a common values case where types are fully informative about the state.
That is for each ti, assume Fi(·|ti) is derived from the Dirac measure where the singleton set {ti}
receives measure 1.8
3.2.1. Aggregate Distribution. Conditionally on his type ti and the state θ, player i constructs the
distribution of the aggregate as a function of others’ strategies s−i. To do so, the player uses his
beliefs µi. Consider the set L(t′−i) = {t−i ∈ T−i : tj ≤ t′j for all j 6= i} which is the set of type
vectors lower than t−i. Take ` ∈ Nn−1 and denote by a−i,` the vector of actions where each j 6= i
plays action aj,`j . Define A−i(γ, θ) = {` ∈ Nn−1 : Γi(a−i,`, θ) = γ} to be the set of combinations of
actions which yield aggregate value γ at state θ. Recall that s−i = (sj) where each sj = (sj,h) is a
vector of cutoff types; j plays action ah if and only if his type is in [sj,h, sj,h+1]. I use the shorthand
τi = (θ, s−i, ti). The aggregate distribution is described by the following probability mass function
gi(γ|τi) = µi(ti, θ)
 ⋃
`∈A−i(γ,θ)
{
L((sj,`j+1)j)
⋂
L((sj,`j )j)
} .
Denote by Gi(·|τi) the cumulative distribution function obtained from gi. Gi gives the conditional
probability that Γi is strictly less than γ.
8The Dirac measure gives measure 1 to every set that contains ti, and 0 to others. Then,
R
R u(θ)fi(θ|ti)dθ = u(ti)
for every function u.
10 LAURENT MATHEVET
3.2.2. The Assumptions. Players believe that larger states are more likely when their type increases.
That is, if t′i > ti, then Fi(.|t′i) >st Fi(.|ti).9 Players also believe that larger opponents’ types are
more likely when their type and the state increase. Formally, if (t′i, θ
′) ≥ (ti, θ), then µi(t′i, θ′) ≥st
µi(ti, θ).10 Further, the likelihood of states which are excessively far from a player’s type is null.
There exists Di such that fi(θ|ti) = 0 whenever |ti − θ| > Di.11 Finally, for each γ and s−i,
gi(γ|·, s−i, ·) and fi are continuous and bounded.
Beyond these assumptions, beliefs formation is free. Players may not share the same prior beliefs,
hence they can have heterogeneous beliefs. Players need not even be Bayesian, and they can have
updating biases.
4. Confidence and Rationalizability
This section defines a notion of confidence and investigates its role in determining the size of
the set of rationalizable strategy profiles. As noted before, there are many ways of formalizing
confidence and several definitions are possible. The definition adopted here is related to a player’s
perceived precision of his information, which he may misconstrue.
The basic ingredients of the definition are the average state and the average aggregate. Let
F ki (θ|ti) = Fi(θ−k|ti) denote i’s state beliefs Fi after a rightward shift by an amount k ≥ 0. Based
on his assessment of the aggregate distribution, each player i predicts that the average aggregate
is the expectation of Gi(·|τi), denoted Γei [Gi(τi)].
Since a player produces beliefs about the state and about others’ types, confidence has two
dimensions. State confidence is defined first. Throughout, v will be any positive number.
Definition 1. Player i’s state confidence is represented by function kiF where k
i
F (v) is the supremum
of all k such that Fi(·|ti + v) ≥st F ki (·|ti) for all ti.
Confidence of state beliefs is the minimal shift in player i’s state beliefs after an increase in type.
If the state beliefs belong to a location-scale family,12 such as the normal or logistic distribution,
then state confidence answers the question: When a player’s type increases by v, by how much
does he think the state will increase on average? This is asking the player how good he thinks his
type is at reproducing changes of the state. A confident player will think that his type “picks up”
the right magnitude of shifts, so kiF should be relatively large. In the case of normal state beliefs
with mean αti, as in Section 2, kiF (v) = αv.
9>st stands for the (strict) first-order stochastic dominance ordering. >st means that for every strictly increasing
function u on R,
R
R u(θ)dFi(·|t′i) >
R
R u(θ)dFi(·|ti).
10This is the multidimensional stochastic-dominance ordering.
11Instead, one could assume that the likelihood of states which are excessively far from a player’s type is arbitrarily
small. Then, for the results to hold, assume ui is bounded and continuous.
12Let f(θ) be any pdf. Then for k ∈ R and any σ > 0, the family of pdfs (1/σ)f((θ − k)/σ) indexed by (k, σ)
is called the location-scale family with standard pdf f . Many distributions such as the normal distribution form
location-scale families.
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The other notion of confidence, defined below, involves a player’s beliefs about others’ types.
Suppose the player considers the counterfactual that his opponents decrease their strategies while
his type increases. The first piece of information is bad news, because the aggregate should decrease,
while the second piece of information is good news, because the state and others’ types are larger
and this should lead to larger actions. The counterfactual information which receives more weight
is the indicator of confidence.
Define c(v) = (v, v, kiF (v)) where v is a vector with identical entries v. The vector τi+c(v), equal
to (s−i + v, ti + v, θ + kiF (v)), represents the counterfactual information: The opponents decrease
their strategies while the type (hence the state) is higher. Think of strategies as bins, delimited
by cutoffs. When a player’s type falls into a bin, he plays the corresponding action. As players
other than i raise their cutoffs from s−i to s−i + v, it translates all the bins upwards by v, thereby
delaying the play of larger actions. Simultaneously, i’s type rises by v. By how much does player
i think the aggregate will decrease on average? Asking this question is an indirect way of asking
player i how correlated to others’ types he thinks his type is. In other words, it indicates how good
the player thinks his type is at reproducing changes in others’ types. If the player believes his type
is very good at it, then his opponents’ types should have increased by v (more or less), since his
type has increased by v. If so, his opponents’ types should fall into the same bins as before despite
the translation. Therefore, the aggregate should not decrease too much.
A ‘really’ confident, or overconfident, player would believe that Gi(τi + c(v)) ≥st Gi(τi). Despite
the contradictory information, that player believes that larger aggregates are at least as likely
as before. As a result, if asked by how much the average aggregate should decrease, he would
answer zero. The smaller the answer, the higher the confidence. All of this is captured in the next
definition.
Definition 2. Player i’s aggregate confidence is represented by function kiG, defined such that
kiG(v) ≥ Γei [Gi(τi) ∨Gi(τi + c(v))]− Γei [Gi(τi + c(v))] for all τi.13
In the absence of state of nature under private values, aggregate confidence is the only confidence
indicator. This case is technically equivalent to the common value case with full state confidence.
A player becomes more confident if kiF increases and k
i
G decreases, both uniformly. The relation-
ship between state and aggregate confidence is one-sided. If a player gains state confidence, then
his aggregate confidence rises. The explanation is quite simple. If a player believes that the state
is higher on average than he first thought, then he will believe higher aggregates are more likely.
4.1. The Main Theorem. The main result features function ε which synthesizes the forces that
determine the size of the set of rationalizable profiles,
ε(F,G,u) = inf{v > 0 : v > v ⇒M∗(kiF (v), ti)− kiG(v)C∗(ti) > 0, ∀ ti, i}. (4.1)
13Recall that ∨ stands for the least upper-bound (w.r.t. ≥st here) between two elements of a set. Moreover, as
the definition indicates, if a player is confident with level kiG then he trivially is confident with level k
′i
G > k
i
G.
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Functions M∗ and C∗ are defined in the appendix as (A.7) and (A.8). Each of them measures
one kind of complementarities. The former is the expected minimal amount of complementarities
between own action and state. The latter is the expected maximal amount of strategic comple-
mentarities.
Theorem 1. In the game of incomplete information, the distance between any two profiles of
rationalizable strategies is less than ε(F,G,u).14
The proof is relegated to the appendix, but I provide an intuitive treatment. Consider a three-
player game where each player only cares about the sum of his opponents’ actions, such as in a
search model. For simplicity, suppose that each player only has two actions and that the extremal
equilibria s and s are symmetric. Say that each player is very confident, and consider player 1.
Going from the largest to the smallest equilibrium, 2 and 3’s strategies decrease (i.e. they search
less) and 1’s cutoff type increases from s1 to s1, which represents the fact that 1 delays the play of
the larger action at the smallest equilibrium. At type s1, player 1 expects roughly the same total
action, on average, from s−1 as what he expected from s−1 when his type was s1. This is because
he is confident. However, his type is now strictly higher, so player 1 cannot be indifferent between
the two actions at s1. Hence a high level of confidence cannot support two equilibria.
Note that full confidence is not necessary for uniqueness; full aggregate confidence alone implies
uniqueness. The above argument shows that a confident player does not expect his opponents’
actions to change much across profiles. It appears in ε(·) that a confident player acts as if he
were not affected much by the complementarities, and as such he tends to play actions regardless
of others’ strategies. This favors uniqueness. On the other hand, the beliefs of a poorly confident
player are easily swayed by others’ strategies. This gives bite to the complementarities, and favors
multiplicity.
There are two main comparative statics lessons to learn from the theorem. The first one is
that state sensitivity tends to shrink the set of rationalizable strategy profiles, whereas strategic
complementarities tend to enlarge it. Function ε is, indeed, decreasing in M∗ while it is increasing in
C∗. The explanation is intuitive. State sensitivity disconnects a player from the others, by inciting
him to base his action on his type, while strategic complementarities connect players together.
Interestingly, the strategic complementarities, which are known to favor multiplicity, may also
enlarge the equilibrium set when they get stronger.
The second lesson is that confidence tends to shrink the set of rationalizable profiles. This fact,
which is the object of the next corollary, is strong because it holds across belief structures.
Corollary 1. If players become more confident, that is kiF ≥ kiF ′ and kiG ≤ kiG′ for all i ∈ N , then
ε(F,G,u) ≤ ε(F ′, G′,u).
The mechanism by which confidence affects the size appears clearly in ε(·). As mentioned above,
when players become more confident, it directly lowers the impact of strategic complementarities.
14The distance between two profiles s = (si,`) and s
′ = (s′i,`) is given by the maximal distance between any two
cutoffs maxi max`=1,...,Mi−1 |s′i,` − si,`|.
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At the same time, confidence strengthens the monotonic relationship with states; and thus players
want to play larger actions. As a consequence, uniqueness is obtained in the case where kiG = 0
(and kiF (v) = v). I call this case full confidence.
Corollary 2. If players are fully confident, then there is a unique equilibrium.15
4.2. Applications.
4.2.1. The Investment Game. In the game of Section 2, it is easy to compute M∗(kiF (v), ti) = k
i
F (v)
and C∗(ti) = 1. The theorem implies that all rationalizable strategy profiles are contained in a set
of diameter
ε(F,G,u) = inf{v > 0 : v > v ⇒ kiF (v) > kiG(v), ∀ ti, i}. (4.2)
Here aggregate confidence is always between 0 and 1, so let k∗i = supv≥0 k
i
G(v). Thus ε(F,G,u) ≤
inf{v : kiF (v) > k∗i , ∀ ti, i}. If Fi is a normal distribution with mean 34 ti, and k∗i = 316 , then
ε(F,G,u) ≤ 14 .
4.2.2. Global Games. Global games (Carlsson and van Damme [4], Frankel, Morris and Pauzner
[10], Morris and Shin [18]) give a nice illustration of these concepts. The main global game result is
a uniqueness result as ν → 0 (see Section 2). As ν → 0, the signal becomes perfectly reliable, and
so we approach full confidence. Formally, limσ→0 kiF (v) = v and limσ→0 k
i
G(v) = 0;
16 this implies
uniqueness by Corollary 2. The other uniqueness result is concerned with a uniform prior and holds
for any ν > 0. In this case, players are also fully confident according to the present definitions,
despite the unreliability of the signals. The signal may indeed be unreliable, yet it is considered
good at reproducing changes, because of the absence of any prior information.
4.2.3. “Non Global Games”. The result can also be used in non global-games scenarios (see also
Sections 6.2 and 6.3). Consider the arms race model of Baliga and Sjostrom [3]. Two countries
decide whether to invest in a weapons program (0) or not (1). Let d > 0 represent the disutility
of having a less advanced weapons system than the other country. A country that builds the new
weapons system while the other does not receives a gain of µ > 0. A country that acquires new
weapons has to bear a psychological or monetary cost ti ∈ (µ, d). The game is summarized by the
following payoff matrix:
1 0
1 0, 0 −d, µ− t2
0 µ− t1,−d −t1,−t2
Unlike global games, types t1 and t2 are independently drawn from the same distribution F with
pdf f and support [0, d]. As Baliga and Sjostrom argue, costs of acquiring weapons may depend
on political considerations that are specific to a certain country or a certain leader, hence the
independence assumption. Note that this game is under private values. The theorem implies that
15If players are fully confident, then kiG(·) = 0. Then ε(F,G,u) = 0 because M∗(kiF (v), ti) > 0 by assumption.
16It is not trivial to show this because convergence has to be uniform in type and strategies.
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if 1/(d − µ) > f(t) for all t, then there is a unique equilibrium. This condition is sufficient for
uniqueness but not necessary. Baliga and Sjostrom obtain a weaker sufficient condition.
5. Optimism and Rationalizability
This section investigates the role of optimism and confidence in determining how the rationaliz-
able profiles change position within the set of all profiles.
5.1. Optimism. Optimism is the sentiment that the outcome of a situation will be “favorable,”
where favorable means “large outcomes” in this context. The main reason for studying optimism is
for comparative purposes across groups of players or across time periods. The starting point is to
define what it means to become more optimistic. In games with incomplete information, becoming
more optimistic will be interpreted as having a better outlook on the aggregate value and the state
with the same (informational) type. But this is not enough to determine the movements of the
set of rationalizable strategy profiles; a player may become more optimistic but his newly-found
optimism may be fragile in the sense that the slightest decrease in type could bring him back to
his old “beliefs.” In the latter case, this only causes minor changes in the equilibria. This explains
why the robustness of optimism has to be addressed.
Let Gi and G′i be the aggregate distributions derived from beliefs µi and µ
′
i.
Definition 3. Player i becomes more optimistic from (Fi, µi) to (F ′i , µ
′
i), if F
′
i (·|ti) ≥st Fi(·|ti) for
all ti, and G′i(·|τi) ≥st Gi(·|τi) for all τi.
A player becomes more optimistic if, with the same (informational) type as before, he now
believes that larger states and larger aggregates are more likely. From Milgrom and Roberts [15],
an increase in optimism leads the largest and the smallest rationalizable strategy profiles to increase.
By how much? The question is important because the answer will say how much more likely a
currency attack or a bank run should be, for example. The answer relies on quantifying the
variations in optimism. Before doing so, I return to the notion of confidence.
Interestingly, state confidence will play a role in positioning rationalizable profiles as well. It
appears under a different form than previously defined. This is the next definition.
Definition 4. Player i’s upper state confidence is the function KiF , where K
i
F (v) is the infimum
of all k such that Fi(θ + k|ti + v) ≥ Fi(θ|ti) for all θ and all ti.
Upper state confidence is the amount by which a stochastically dominant distribution should
be shifted down to become dominated. It is always greater than state confidence as defined by
Definition 1 and thus coined lower state confidence. Figure 2 depicts the difference between them.
When the beliefs’ shape changes dramatically after a change in type, the two concepts can give
different values. It should be clear from the picture that both notions are equivalent when changes
in types lead to uniform translation of the distribution. This is the case for well-behaved beliefs
such as the location-scale families. They are also equivalent in private values.
As usual, since players have two types of beliefs, there are two notions of change in optimism.
State optimism is dealt with first.
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Figure 2. Upper and Lower State Confidence
Definition 5. Player i becomes more optimistic from Fi to F ′i by an amount ω
i
1, defined as the
supremum of all ω such that F ′i (·|ti) ≥st Fωi (·|ti) for all ti.
If a player becomes more optimistic about the state, then his state beliefs shift up, and ω1
measures the amplitude of the shift. For all location-scale families, this is simply the amount by
which a player expects the state to increase on average. The other notion of optimism involves the
beliefs about other’s types. The definition is similar in spirit. The magnitude of an increase in
optimism is the amount by which a player thinks the average aggregate will increase.
Even though a player may become a lot more optimistic, this could be very fragile, in the sense
that slight decreases in type may temper it. In other words, a player may believe that the average
aggregate will increase a lot, but minor bad news could destroy his new beliefs. In this situation,
the rationalizable profiles should not change much. To account for this, the definition has to test
for the robustness or persistence of optimism.
Define o(v) = (KiF (v)−ωi1,0, v) where 0 is a vector with identical entries 0. The vector τi−o(v),
equal to (θ−KiF (v)+ωi1, s−i, ti−v), represents an optimistic perspective on the state, deteriorated
by a bad news. The perspective on the state is more optimistic than under τi, because the state is
larger by ωi1, which is good news; however, the type decreases by v (which in turn decreases the state
by the confidence level). Recall that G′i is more “optimistic” than Gi in the stochastic-dominance
sense. To measure robustness, the expected values of G′i(τi−o(v)) and Gi(τi) are to be compared for
every v. This corresponds to the following scenario. Take a player who has become more optimistic,
worsen his information, and ask him by how much he thinks the expected aggregate has changed.
When v is small, the optimistic player with G′i(τi − o(v)) is still more optimistic than before, by
an amount measured by the difference in expected values. When v is large, the player who once
was more optimistic is now more pessimistic, because G′i(τi− o(v)) is dominated by Gi(τi). In this
situation, I assume that the player uses a worst-case rule. What is the most pessimistic forecast
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that he can make? The supremum of the two distributions serves as the most optimistic scenario.
The worst prediction the player can make is to believe that the average aggregate will decrease by
the difference from the most optimistic case.
Define distribution
χ(τi, v) =
{
Gi(τi), if G′i(τi − o(v)) ≥st Gi(τi)
Gi(τi) ∨G′i(τi − o(v)), otherwise.
This distribution will express the above worst-case rule in the next definition.
Definition 6. The robustness of player i’s optimism change from µi to µ′i is given by function ω
i
2,
where ωi2(v) is defined such that ω
i
2(v) ≤ Γei [G′i(τi − o(v))]− Γei [χi(τi, v)] for all τi.
5.2. Main Theorem. The main result provides a lower bound on the distance covered by the
extremal equilibria after a change in optimism. For all B = (Fi, Gi)i and B′ = (F ′i , G
′
i)i, define
δ(B,B′,u) = sup
{
v : M∗(ωi1 −KiF (v), ti) + min{ωi2(v)C∗(ti), ωi2(v)C∗(ti)} ≥ 0, ∀ ti, i
}
(5.1)
where C∗ is defined analogously to C∗ (with min instead of max). The main result summarizes the
forces that contribute to position the set of rationalizable profiles.
Theorem 2. In the game of incomplete information, if each player i ∈ N becomes more optimistic
from (Fi, µi) to (F ′i , µ
′
i), then the extremal rationalizable profiles both increase by at least δ(B,B
′,u).
The comparative statics lessons are twofold. First, the more optimistic players become, the more
the rationalizable strategy profiles tend to increase. This result holds across belief structures. That
is, if optimism increases more from one belief structure to another than for another pair of belief
structures, then the rationalizable strategy profiles tend to cover more distance for the first pair.
Interestingly, confidence is involved in positioning the rationalizable profiles as well. Its role is
intuitive. If a player has little confidence in his type, then as he becomes more optimistic, it takes
a lot to convince him that his newly-found optimism was unfounded, which leads to larger shifts
in the rationalizable strategies. All of this is summarized in the next corollary.
Corollary 3. Everything else equal, if players become more optimistic and less confident, then the
minimal amount by which the extremal rationalizable profiles must rise increases.
The second lesson is concerned with the effects of payoffs. Players’ sensitivity to the state, M∗,
determines how they react to the changes in states that they foresee. As this sensitivity increases,
the effect of optimism, part of which is to expect larger states, is enhanced. Players then want
to play larger actions. The role of strategic complementarities is ambiguous. On the one hand,
when a player becomes more optimistic, he foresees larger aggregate values, and the strength of the
complementarities determines his reaction to it. On the other hand, recall that location is tied to
the robustness of optimism. When a player’s information is worsened, so he becomes pessimistic,
the effect of strong complementarities is reversed. Bad news become worse news.
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5.2.1. The Investment Game. Izmalkov and Yildiz [12] define a notion of optimism in the in-
vestment game of Section 2. Players have a uniform prior about θ and linear types of the form
ti = θ + νi where i ∈ [−1, 1]. Each player i is allowed to have his own subjective beliefs about
(1, 2) given by Pri. The uniform distribution of θ implies that players exhibit full state confidence;
so kiF (v) = v. Izmalkov and Yildiz consider fixed state beliefs, so ω1 = 0. The linear payoffs give
C∗(ti) = C∗(ti) = 1 and M∗(−KiF (v), ti) = −kiF (v) = −v. As a result, Theorem 2 says
δ(B,B′,u) = sup {v : −v + ω2(v) ≥ 0, ∀ ti, i} . (5.2)
The homogeneity in the setup allows to go further. Since the game is symmetric, the relevant
aggregate distribution is Pri(tj > ti|θ, ti), which is Pri(j > i). Denote the latter by q. q is the
definition of optimism in Izmalkhov and Yildiz [12]. It is an intuitive indicator on second-order
beliefs, which gives the probability that a player believes that his opponent receives a higher type
than his. Since ω2(v) = ∆q, the variation in q, (5.2) is consistent with Izmalkov and Yildiz [12],
according to which the unique profile varies by ∆q.
6. Applications
6.1. Currency Crises. Investors’ sentiments play an important role in financial markets. To
study this role, I introduce confidence into the currency crisis model of Morris and Shin [16].17
The previous results will suggest that the most confident investors may drive financial markets.
The model will also suggest that less optimism tends to enlarge the set of outcomes. If investors
become less optimistic, then they believe that an attack is less likely, so they are inclined not to
attack. However, if they maintain a sufficiently high level of confidence, there may be bandwagon
effects when private information becomes favorable.
Consider a continuum of players [0, 1]. Each player takes one of two actions, 0 and 1, where
action 0 is to keep the unit of an asset, and action 1 is to sell it short. Keeping the asset (action
0) yields a net payoff of zero. The consequence of selling (action 1) depends on the proportion of
agents who also choose to sell the asset short and on the state of nature θ. The proportion of agents
taking action 1 determines the regime of the economy, which can either be the status quo or the
new regime. The threshold at which the economy changes regime is given by r(θ). Let
∫
[0,1] aidi be
the proportion of players choosing 1. If this proportion exceeds r(θ), then the economy enters the
new regime. A player cannot change the regime on his own, so he only cares about whether or not
the others’ actions change the regime. Formally, Γi(a−i, θ) = 1{R[0,1] aidi>r(θ)}. Player i’s payoffs are
given by the following matrix:
Γi = 1 Γi = 0
1 u(θ)− c −c
0 0 0
17Izmalkhov and Yildiz have already provided an insightful study of optimism in this model.
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Partition the set [0, 1] of players into finitely many subsets, each containing either a single player, or
a continuum of identical players.18 I abuse notation and denote (a representative player from) each
group by i. The following conditions are imposed: u(·) > c and u is strictly increasing; and there
exist θ and θ such that r(θ) = 0 when θ > θ and r(θ) = 0 when θ < θ. Under these conditions, the
payoff assumptions are satisfied, except state monotonicity which only holds weakly. This implies
a minor change in (A.5) (Appendix) whose first part becomes
M(kiF , τi, v) = Eθ|ti [(u(θ + k
i
F (v))− u(θ))gi(1|τi + c(v))].19 (6.1)
In turn, this implies a change in function ε, which becomes
ε(F,G,u) = inf{v > 0 : v > v ⇒M(kiF , τi, v) > kiG(v)C∗(ti), ∀τi, i}. (6.2)
Theorem 1 holds such that the distance between rationalizable profiles is bounded by (6.2). This
has several implications, described in the next propositions and a remark.
Proposition 1. If each investor i becomes more optimistic and more confident, then ε(F,G, u) ≤
ε(F ′, G′,u).
The presence of the aggregate distribution in (6.1) obfuscates the role of confidence. Confidence
alone may no longer “control” the upper bound on the size of the rationalizable set, because the
probability of an attack, as perceived by each player, is a crucial ingredient. If investors believe
an attack is less likely, and de facto are less optimistic, then they may decrease their strategies.
This may cause the smallest rationalizable profile to decrease. This need not be, however, if the
level of confidence is high enough, for investors may not believe that lower strategies will have
serious consequences on actions (when information is appropriately favorable). Overall, the effect
is unclear. What remains clear is that full confidence, while demanding, still implies uniqueness.
Proposition 2. If investors are fully confident, then there is a unique equilibrium.
Remark. Theorem 1 suggests that the most confident investors can drive financial markets. Al-
though it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore this claim in detail, I give some intuition.
Suppose that there are two groups of investors, 1 and 2. If both groups are very confident, then
there is a unique equilibrium. Instead, assume group 2 is a group of poorly confident investors.
Depending on the size of both groups, the above results say that multiplicity may reappear. When
it is the case, denote the extremal rationalizable profiles by s = (s1, s2) and s = (s1, s2). One way
of measuring the impact of others’ strategies on a group’s beliefs is via si − si. This is the amount
by which the equilibrium cutoff type has to increase to offset the change of beliefs caused by the
change of others’ strategies sj − sj . This is an indicator of who influences who, because it says
which group has to increase its strategy more in response to a (smaller) change in the other group’s
strategy. In this case, confidence implies s2 − s2 ≥ s1 − s1. That is, the poorly confident investors
18Identical players share the same state and aggregate beliefs. Frankel et al. [10] use this technique to extend
their results to continuum of players.
19At any rationalizable profile, gi(1|τi) > 0, because any rationalizable strategy must play 1 for large types.
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change their strategies more in response to a smaller change in the opposing strategies (compared
to the confident ones). As such, they can be seen as following the most confident investors.20
6.2. Empirical Industrial Organization. A recent literature in industrial organization aims to
estimate models with incomplete information. In these models, the econometrician cannot assume
the existence of a common prior, nor can he assume specific signaling structures. Moreover, data
do not always support Bayesian updating. To estimate the model, the econometrician assumes,
however, that the data he observes come from a unique equilibrium. My results help appreciate
the nature of this assumption, and they provide a classification of the parameter values for which
the model is identified.
I present a simplified version of Aradillas-Lopez [2]’s incomplete information model. Two firms
play a simultaneous-move game. Think, for example, of a technology adoption game for comple-
mentary products. Each firm has to decide whether to provide a technology. Firm 1 would prefer
to provide technology 1 if firm 2 provides technology 2 where ti represents the market prospects
from i’s perspective. The exogenous determinants of firm i’s profit are represented by Xi ∈ Rni .
The payoffs, known to both firms, are given by the following matrix:
Y2 = 1 Y2 = 0
Y1 = 1 X ′1β1 + t1 + α1, X ′2β2 + t2 + α2 X ′1β1 + t1, 0
Y1 = 0 0, X ′2β2 + t2 0, 0
The game is assumed to have strategic complementarities: α1, α2 ≥ 0.21 At the beginning of
the game, each firm i observes its type ti and X = (X1, X2). The firms know the joint distribution
H(t1, t2), and using H they formulate beliefs about the other firm’s type. The econometrician is
assumed to know H but he does not know the coefficients αi and βi, i = 1, 2. Given a sample
{(Y1,t, X1,t, Y2,t, X2,t)}, the econometrician tries to estimate these coefficients. The main purpose
of the exercise is to predict the effect of an exogenous change in X1 or X2 on the likelihood of
investment.
To estimate the coefficients, the econometrician assumes that the sample comes from a unique
equilibrium (of the incomplete information game) at the true parameter values. This assumption
guarantees that the likelihood function is well-defined, so it is important to understand which
implications it has on H and the coefficients.
This is a private information setup, hence state confidence is kiF (v) = v. It is easy to compute
M∗(v, ti) = v and C∗i (θ) = αi. Note Gi(1|sj , ti) = H(sj1|ti) where H(tj |ti) is the conditional
distribution computed from H.
20This is a relative claim. Since there are multiple equilibria, the most confident investors also follow the least
confident ones, but not as much in comparison to the poorly confident ones.
21Aradillas-Lopez [2] is interested in a larger class of games than games with complementarities, such as entry
games for example. So he does not assume αi ≥ 0.
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Although Theorem 1 does not characterize equilibrium uniqueness, its estimate of the size is
quite accurate for games with linear payoffs. It gives a simple relationship between G and the
values of coefficients for which uniqueness holds and the model is identified
ε(F,G,u) =
{
v : v > v ⇒ 1
αi
>
kiG(v)
v
∀i
}
.
First, the coefficients βi’s do not play any role in uniqueness. Only the αi’s are relevant. Second,
in semi-parametric estimations, H is assumed to belong to a family of distributions where certain
coefficients are unknown. For example, H could be a normal distribution with means µ1 and µ2,
and variance-covariance matrix V12. Consider the set of all (µ1, µ2, V12, α1, α2) to be the parameter
space. Theorem 1 gives the econometrician a description of the regions of the parameter space for
which the model is identified, before he actually estimates the model. A priori, if all values of αi’s
were possible, then uniqueness would nearly require full aggregate confidence. That is, kiG(v) = 0
for i = 1, 2. This is a strong assumption, because it requires t1 and t2 to be perfectly correlated
under H.
6.3. The Effect of Updating Biases. This section studies the strategic implications of updating
biases on the outcomes of a game. While the Bayesian paradigm is standard, it is conceivable
that real-life agents may depart from it in more or less systematic ways. Epstein [7] provides an
axiomatic model of non-Bayesian updating where he reports different types of biases. I analyze the
strategic implications of the prior and overreaction bias.
Players have a prior (cumulative) distribution Pi. In common values, Pi : Θ → [0, 1] represents
the prior beliefs about the state of nature. In private values, Pi : T−i → [0, 1] represents the prior
beliefs about the types of i’s opponents. Upon receiving type ti, a player using Bayesian updating
would have posterior beliefs BUi(·|ti). To satisfy the assumptions, suppose that Bayesian beliefs
are increasing in type with respect to first-order stochastic dominance. Let Qi(·|ti) be the posterior
beliefs that i actually holds upon receiving ti.
6.3.1. Prior Bias and Underreaction. A player who has a prior bias gives “too little” weight to
observation and “too much” weight to his prior knowledge. In the spirit of Epstein [7], this can be
modeled as
Qi(·|ti) = αPi(·) + (1− α)BUi(·|ti), (6.3)
where α ∈ [0, 1] measures the magnitude of the bias. Since Pi gives no weight to the data/type, it
is clear that Qi displays less confidence than BUi(·|ti), because the stochastic dominance shift is
reduced by the presence of the prior.
In light of previous results, such a prior bias tends to favor multiplicity in general. Note that Qi
and BUi are not ranked regarding optimism. The shape of beliefs (6.3) can change dramatically as
the type varies, in a similar fashion as Figure 2. In common values, this leads to wonder whether the
current definition of state confidence underestimates the role of the type. The stochastic dominance
shift can be small, while the average state increases widely. To capture this effect, state confidence
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could be defined as the change in the average state. This new definition would change slightly the
expression of ε, but not necessarily its accuracy.
6.3.2. Overreaction. A player who is subject to overreaction gives “too much” weight to observa-
tion, leading him to overestimate the importance of his type. Let µ be the expectation under Pi.
This bias can be modeled as
Qi(·|ti) = BUi(·|ti + α(ti − µ)), (6.4)
where α ∈ [0, 1] measures the magnitude of the bias. A biased player believes at ti what a Bayesian
player would believe at ti+α(ti−µ). In other words, after receiving ti > (<)µ, the player interprets
his type as a better (worse) news than what it actually is. Because ti +α(ti− µ) = (1 +α)ti−αµ,
overreaction leads to larger confidence level than Bayesian updating. Therefore, it promotes tighter
rationalizable sets.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, I have introduced confidence and developed optimism, two notions of sentiments
that capture essential features of the beliefs that are involved in shaping the set of rationalizable
strategy profiles. The main advantage of the approach is twofold. First, it does not specify the origin
of the beliefs, and thus it subsumes the case of heterogenous priors, general signaling technologies,
and even non-Bayesian updating. Second, it synthesizes these sentiments and the properties of
the payoffs within explicit expressions that can give insightful comparative statics. The paper also
includes a number of applications; one of them suggests that the most confident investors may be
more influential than the least confident investors. Thoroughly studying this claim is an interesting
avenue for future research.
Appendix A. Proofs
The entire argument of the first result is as follows:
(1) The games of incomplete information under consideration are games with strategic comple-
mentarities (GSC). This implies the existence of a largest and a smallest equilibrium, as in
Milgrom-Roberts [15] and Vives [27].
(2) Furthermore, the payoffs display some monotonicity between actions and states, and the
beliefs display monotonicity in type. As a direct implication of Van Zandt and Vives [25],
(a) best-responses to monotone (in-type) strategies are monotone and (b) the extremal
equilibria are in monotone strategies.
(3) I prove that the best-reply mapping, restricted to monotone strategies, is a contraction for
all pairs of profiles that are distant enough. Since the extremal equilibria are in monotone
strategies, they can be no further apart than this distance.
(4) Since extremal equilibria bound the set of profiles in rationalizable strategies in GSC, this
gives a distance between any pair of rationalizable profiles.
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In view of (2), I will only consider monotone (in-type) strategies. Any such strategy can be
represented as a finite sequence of cutoff points, because there is a finite number of actions. I call
those cutoff points real cutoffs as opposed to the fictitious cutoffs defined next. The relationship
between the two families of cutoffs is given in Section A.2. Player i’s strategy si = (si,`)
Mi−1
`=1 where
each si,` is the threshold type below which i plays a`, and above which he plays a`+1.
According to the next definition, the fictitious cutoff between two actions is the (unique) type at
which a player is indifferent between them. A fictitious cutoff between two actions may not always
exist.
Definition 7. For i ∈ N , the fictitious cutoff point between an and am, denoted cn,m is defined, if
it exists, as the (only) type ti such that Eui(an, s−i, ti)− Eui(am, s−i, ti) = 0.
Recall ∆ui(γ, θ) = ui(an, γ, θ)− ui(am, γ, θ) be the difference in utility from playing an over am
at state θ when others play actions generating γ. Define
Eui(ai, s−i, ti) =
∫
R
∑
γ≥γ
ui(ai, γ, θ)gi(γ|θ, s−i, ti)fi(θ|ti)dθ.
A.1. Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. If v > ε(F,G,u), then for all pairs of actions (an, am), all types ti, strategies s−i,
and i ∈ N such that
Eui(an, s−i, ti)− Eui(am, s−i, ti) ≥ 0 (A.1)
the following inequality holds
Eui(an, s−i + v, ti + v)− Eui(am, s−i + v, ti + v) > 0 (A.2)
Proof. Suppose (A.1) is satisfied. From the definition of state confidence Fi(·|ti+v) ≥st F kiF (v)(·|ti);
thus if the following inequality holds, then it implies (A.2)∫
R
∑
γ≥γ
∆ui(γ, θ)gi(γ|θ, s−i + v, ti + v)fi(θ − kiF (v)|ti)dθ > 0, (A.3)
because
∑
γ≥γ ∆ui(γ, θ)gi(γ|θ, s−i, ti + v) is increasing in θ. After a change of variables, (A.3)
becomes
Eθ|ti
∑
γ≥γ
∆ui(γ, θ + kiF (v))gi(γ|τi + c(v))
 > 0. (A.4)
If the following inequality holds, then it implies (A.4) (because (A.1) holds)
Eθ|ti
∑
γ≥γ
(∆ui(γ, θ + kiF (v))−∆ui(γ, θ))gi(γ|τi + c(v))

+ Eθ|ti
∑
γ≥γ
∆ui(γ, θ)(gi(γ|τi + c(v))− gi(γ|τi))
 > 0. (A.5)
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The first member of (A.5) is strictly positive, because ∆ui is strictly increasing in θ. Although
the second member is not always positive, there is a lower bound on how negative it can be. For
any γ ∈ Gi, define σ(γ) = min{γ′ ∈ Gi : γ′ > γ} to be the successor of γ. By convention, let
Gi(σ(γ)|·) = 1. Note that∑
γ≥γ
∆ui(γ, θ)(gi(γ|τi + c(v))− gi(γ|τi)) =
∑
γ≥γ
(Gi(σ(γ)|τi + c(v))−Gi(σ(γ)|τi))(∆ui(γ, θ)−∆ui(σ(γ), θ)). (A.6)
Define
C∗(θ) = max
{
∆ui(σ(γ), θ)−∆ui(γ, θ)
σ(γ)− γ : γ ∈ Gi
}
(A.7)
to be the largest amount of complementarities in i’s payoffs. Let g∗i be the probability mass function
of distribution Gi(τi) ∨Gi(τi + c(v)). Since ∆ui is increasing in γ, it follows from the definition of
confidence that ∑
γ≥γ(Gi(σ(γ)|τi + c(v))−Gi(σ(γ)|τi))(∆ui(γ, θ)−∆ui(σ(γ), θ))
≥ ∑γ≥γ(Gi(σ(γ)|τi + c(v))−G∗i (σ(γ)|τi))(∆ui(γ, θ)−∆ui(σ(γ), θ))
≥ ∑γ≥γ(Gi(σ(γ)|τi + c(v))−G∗i (σ(γ)|τi))(γ − σ(γ))C∗(θ)
= C∗(θ)
∑
γ γ(gi(γ|τi + c(v))− g∗i (γ|τi))
≥ −C∗(θ)kiG(v)
For x ∈ R, define
M∗(θ, x) = min
(γ,n,m)
∆ui(am, an, γ, θ + x)−∆ui(am, an, γ, θ) (A.8)
to be the smallest amount of state monotonicity in i’s payoff. Therefore, if the following inequality
holds, then it implies (A.5)
Eθ|ti [M∗(θ, k
i
F (v))] + k
i
G(v)Eθ|ti [C
∗(θ)] > 0 (A.9)
By definition of ε(F,G,u), if v > ε(F,G,u), then (A.9) holds for all pairs of actions an and am,
types ti, strategies s−i, and i ∈ N . This implies that (A.5), hence (A.4) and (A.2) are satisfied for
all these parameters. 
A.2. Real vs. Fictitious Cutoffs and Proposition 5. The real cutoffs were defined as the
threshold types that separate an action from its successor. They are sufficient to represent any
increasing strategy. How to recover the real cutoffs from the fictitious cutoffs? The following
example illustrates the problem.
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Example 1. Consider a game satisfying all the assumptions. Let there be two players. let A1 =
A2 = {0, 1, 2}. There will be three fictitious cutoffs, c1,0, c2,0 and c2,1, but only two are needed
to represent a player’s best-response. Which ones? For instance, suppose strategy (0.2, 0.8) is a
best-response for i to some strategy sj of player j. It consists in playing 0 for types below 0.2, 2
for types above 0.8, and 1 in between. In this case, the first real cutoff, si,0, that separates 0 and
1 is 0.2 = c1,0. The second real cutoff, si,1, that separates 1 and 2 is 0.8 = c2,1. Now, consider the
following best-response (0.4, 0.4) to s′j . In this case, the player never plays 1 except possibly on a
set of measure zero (when receiving exactly type 0.4). The first real cutoff, s′i,0, that separates 0
and 1 is 0.4 = c′2,0, but the second real cutoff, s′i,1, is also c
′
2,0, because 1 is not played. So the real
cutoffs can change which fictitious cutoff they take value of.
This leads to the following definition where the real cutoffs are defined inductively from the
fictitious ones.22
Definition 8. Given s−i, the largest real cutoff, si,Mi−1, is the fictitious cutoff cMi,α for which there
exists  > 0 such that E∆ui(ai,Mi , ai, s−i, ti) > 0 for all actions ai 6= ai,Mi whenever ti > cMi,α,
and E∆ui(ai,α, ai, s−i, ti) > 0 for all actions ai 6= ai,α whenever ti ∈ (cMi,α − , cMi,α). Assuming
si,` = cn,m (with n > m), the real cutoff si,`−1 = cn,m if ` > m. Otherwise, if ` = m, then si,` = cm,β
for which there exists  > 0 such that E∆ui(ai,m, ai, s−i, ti) > 0 for all actions ai 6= ai,m whenever
ti > cm,β, and E∆ui(ai,β, ai, s−i, ti) > 0 for all actions ai 6= ai,β whenever ti ∈ (cmi,β− , cmi,α− ).
The definition is actually straightforward. The dominance regions imply that ai,Mi will be played.
So, the largest real cutoff is the fictitious cutoff between ai,Mi and the action ai,α played right before.
All actions in between are not played, and so they receive the same real cutoff. Then we proceed
in a downward fashion to find the action which was played right before ai,α, and so on.
The next proposition shows that if an action is strictly dominated by another action for all types
against some opposing profile, then it must be strictly dominated by that same action for all types
and against all opposing profiles. As a result, the same set of fictitious cutoffs will exist across
opposing strategy profiles.
Proposition 4. Let ε(F,G,u) <∞. For any actions ai, a′i ∈ Ai, if there exists s′−i ∈ R such that
Eui(a′i, s
′
−i, ti) > Eui(ai, s
′
−i, ti) for all ti ∈ R, then Eui(a′i, s−i, ti) > Eui(ai, s−i, ti) for all s−i ∈ R
and ti ∈ R.
Proof. Let ε(F,G,u) < ∞. Suppose first a′i > ai. If there is s′−i such that Eui(a′i, s′−i, ti) >
Eui(ai, s′−i, ti) for all ti, then Proposition 3 implies that for all v > ε(F,G,u),
Eui(a′i, s
′
−i + v, ti + v)− Eui(ai, s′−i + v, ti + v) > 0, (A.10)
for all ti. Take any s−i and choose v > ε(F,G,u) for which s′−i + v ≥ s−i (so s−i is a larger
strategy). Since larger strategies lead to larger aggregates, the strategic complementarities imply
22Existence of the fictitious cutoffs poses no problem in the definition, for if a real cutoff takes on the value of a
fictitious cutoff, that fictitious cutoff must exist.
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(by (A.10))
Eui(a′i, s−i, ti + v)− Eui(ai, s−i, ti + v) > 0
for all ti. This is equivalent to Eui(a′i, s−i, ti) − Eui(ai, s−i, ti) > 0 for all ti; since s−i was arbi-
trary, it proves the claim. Suppose now that a′i < ai. If there is s
′
−i such that Eui(a
′
i, s
′
−i, ti) >
Eui(ai, s′−i, ti) for all ti, then Proposition 3 implies that for all v > ε(F,G,u),
Eui(a′i, s
′
−i − v, ti − v)− Eui(ai, s′−i − v, ti − v) > 0, (A.11)
for all ti. Take any s−i and choose v > ε(F,G,u) for which s−i ≥ s′−i − v (so s−i is a smaller
strategy). It follows from (A.11) and the strategic complementarities that
Eui(a′i, s−i, ti − v)− Eui(ai, s−i, ti − v) > 0
for all ti, which is equivalent to Eui(a′i, s−i, ti)− Eui(ai, s−i, ti) > 0. 
The next proposition is an important piece of the main theorem. If all of i’s fictitious cutoffs
contract in response to a variation of s−i, then so do all of i’s real cutoffs. That is, i’s best-reponse
contracts as well.
Proposition 5. Suppose ε(F,G,u) < ∞. If, for some v > 0, |c′n,m − cn,m| < v for all n and m
such that both (fictitious) cutoffs exist, then |si,` − s′i,`| < v for all ` = 1, . . . ,Mi − 1.
Proof. I prove the result by induction. Suppose that, for some v > 0, |c′n,m − cn,m| < v for all n
and m for which both c′n,m and cn,m exist. First, I show that it is true for the largest real cutoff
si,Mi . Then it extends to all other real cutoffs.
The largest action ai,Mi is always played for large enough types. So the largest real cutoff always
takes on the value of the fictitious cutoff between ai,Mi and some other action. Suppose that
si,Mi−1 = cMi,w and s′i,Mi−1 = c
′
Mi,z
where ai,w and ai,z are some actions. Proposition 4 implies
that cMi,z must exist. To see why, suppose cMi,z did not exist. Since aMi must be played, it would
mean that aMi strictly dominates az for all ti against s−i; Proposition 4 would then imply that aMi
strictly dominates az for all ti and all opposing strategies, s′−i in particular, making the existence
of c′Mi,z impossible. So, s
′
i,Mi−1− si,Mi−1 = c′Mi,z − cMi,w = c′Mi,z − cMi,z + cMi,z − cMi,w. Note that
cMi,z − cMi,w ≤ 0 by definition 8. Indeed, si,Mi−1 = cMi,w implies that ai,Mi is played right after
ai,w, and so it must be that ai,Mi was preferred to ai,z for some lower types. That is, cMi,z ≤ cMi,w.
Since c′Mi,z − cMi,z < v, then s′i,Mi−1− si,Mi−1 < v. The proof is similar for si,Mi−1− s′i,Mi−1, hence
|s′i,Mi−1 − si,Mi−1| < v.
For the other real cutoffs, the situation is more difficult, because the action may or may not
be played. There will be several cases, depending on whether the action is played. By induction
hypothesis, suppose that |s′i,`+1−si,`+1| < v. The objective is to show that it implies |s′i,`−si,`| < v.
Case 1: Action ai,` is played both under si and s′i. This case is similar to the case of the largest
real cutoff, and the proof is identical.
Case 2: Action ai,` is played neither under si nor s′i. Then, by definition, si,` = si,`+1 and
s′i,` = s
′
i,`+1. By induction hypothesis, |s′i,` − si,`| < v.
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Case 3: Action ai,` is not played under si, but it is played under s′i. Then, si,` = cw,z for some
actions ai,w and ai,z such that z < ` < w, and s′i,` = c
′
`,x for some ai,x. Write s
′
i,`− si,` = c′`,x− cw,z.
First, I establish that both cw,` and c′w,` exist. Action ai,w is played (under si) against s−i but
it cannot strictly dominate ai,` for all types ti, because if it did, then Proposition 4 would imply
that it is also the case (under s′i) against s
′
−i (thus ai,` could not be played under s
′
i, yet it is).
Therefore, cw,` must exist. This implies that for all ti ≥ cw,`,
Eui(ai,w, s−i, ti) > Eui(ai,`, s−i, ti). (A.12)
Let h = (h, . . . , h) where h > ε(F,G,u) is large enough such that s−i + h ≥ s′−i. It follows from
Proposition 3 and (A.12) that for all ti ≥ cw,`,
Eui(ai,w, s−i + h, ti + h) > Eui(ai,`, s−i + h, ti + h)
and thus by strategic complementarities,
Eui(ai,w, s′−i, ti + h) > Eui(ai,`, s
′
−i, ti + h),
for all ti ≥ cw,`. We know ai,` is played (under s′i) against s′−i, so the last inequality implies that
c′w,` exists.
Second, I prove that real cutoff contracts. The following inequality must hold, c′w,` ≥ c′`,x, because
ai,` is played under s′i in an open set of types above c
′
`,x (so it is only for types larger than c
′
`,x that
ai,w can be preferred to ai,`). Similarly, cw,` ≤ cw,z, because ai,w is played under si in an open set
of types above cw,z, hence ai,w started to be preferred to ai,` for smaller types. As a result,
s′i,` − si,` = c′`,x − cw,z ≤ c′w,` − cw,`,
so s′i,` − si,` < v. By a similar reasoning, si,` − s′i,` ≤ c′`,z − c`,z, and so si,` − s′i,` < v. Putting
everything together, |s′i,` − si,`| < v.
Case 4: Action a` is played under si but it is not played under s′i. The argument is similar to
case 3. 
A.3. Proof of Theorem 1. The theorem relies on the concept of a q-contraction, so I define it
first.
Definition 9. Let (X, d) be a metric space. If ξ : X → X satisfies the condition d(ξ(x), ξ(y)) <
d(x, y) for all x, y ∈ X such that d(x, y) > q, then ξ is called a q-contraction.
A traditional contraction mapping “shrinks” the images of all points. A q-contraction only
“shrinks” those of points that are sufficiently far apart (further apart than q).
Proof. Player i’s expected utility of playing ai when his type is ti and the other players play s−i is:
Eui(ai, s−i, ti) =
∫
R
∑
γ≥γ
ui(ai, γ, θ)gi(γ|θ, s−i, ti)fi(θ|ti)dθ. (A.13)
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Now pick n,m ∈ {1, . . . ,Mi} such that n > m. If it exists, the fictitious cutoff between ai,n and
ai,m is defined as the type ti such that
Eui(ai,m, s−i, ti) = Eui(ai,n, s−i, ti),
that is, ∫
R
∑
γ≥γ
∆ui(γ, θ)gi(γ|θ, s−i, cn,m)fi(θ|cn,m)dθ = 0. (A.14)
By state monotonicity, we know that ∆ui is strictly increasing in θ, and increasing in γ. Since
Fi is strictly increasing in ti w.r.t. first-order stochastic dominance, and since Gi is increasing in
(θ, ti) w.r.t. to first-order stochastic dominance, there can be only one type ti that satisfies (A.14).
As a result, the best-replies (which are cutoff strategies) are almost everywhere functions, and not
correspondences. Consider two profiles of strategies for players −i, s−i = (sj,`) and s′−i = (s′j,`).
Denote vj,` = |s′j,` − sj,`| for ` = 1, . . . ,Mj − 1. Let v = maxj 6=i max`∈{1,...,Mj−1} vj,`. At s−i, the
cutoff between ai,n and ai,m is cn,m and satisfies (A.14). At s′−i, the cutoff between ai,n and ai,m is
c′n,m. By way of contradiction, assume c′n,m = cn,m + v so that∫
R
∑
γ≥γ
∆ui(γ, θ)gi(γ|θ, s′−i, cn,m + v)fi(θ|cn,m + v)dθ = 0. (A.15)
If v > ε(F,G,u), Proposition 3 says that (A.14) and (A.15) cannot hold simultaneously. In words,
c′n,m = cn,m + v cannot be the fictitious cutoff at s′−i if cn,m is the cutoff at s−i. Clearly, this is
also true for c′n,m ≥ cn,m + v. Therefore, c′n,m− cn,m < v. The same argument applies to show that
if c′n,m is the cutoff, then it cannot be that cn,m ≥ c′n,m + v is the cutoff at s′−i. The conclusion
is that if v > ε(F,G,u), then |c′n,m − cn,m| < v for all n,m such that both cutoffs exist, and all
i ∈ N . Proposition 5 implies that each i’s best-reply is an ε(F,G,u)-contraction. From Milgrom
and Roberts [15], it follows that there exist two extremal equilibria, s and s, which correspond to
the extremal profiles of rationalizable strategies. Let d be the sup-norm metric. Since bri is an
ε(F,G,u)-contraction, if d(s, s) > ε(F,G,u), then we have
d(s, s) = d(br(s), br(s))
= maxi∈N d(bri(s−i), bri(s−i))
≤ maxi∈N d(bri(s−i − d(s, s)), bri(s−i))
< d(s, s),
where the first inequality holds because best-replies are increasing (in games of strategic comple-
ments).23 This string of inequalities leads to a contradiction, and thus d(s, s) ≤ ε(F,G,u).

23Notice s−i − d(s, s) is a larger strategy than s−i.
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A.4. Theorem 2. I first establish a proposition which will be used in the proof.
Proposition 6. Let {cn,m} be the set of fictitious cutoffs under B, and let {cn,m} be the set of
fictitious cutoffs under B′, where B′ is more optimistic than B. If, for some v > 0, cn,m− c′n,m ≥ v
for all n and m such that both fictitious cutoffs exist, then si,` − s′i,` ≥ v for all ` = 1, . . . ,Mi − 1.
Proof. The result is proved by induction. Suppose that, for some v > 0, cn,m − c′n,m ≥ v for all n
and m such that both fictitious cutoffs exist. First, I show it is true for the largest real cutoff si,Mi .
Then it extends to all other real cutoffs.
Suppose that si,Mi−1 = cMi,w and s′i,Mi−1 = c
′
Mi,z
where ai,w and ai,z are some actions. Because
c′Mi,z exists, ai,z is preferred to ai,Mi for all ti ≤ c′Mi,z (under B′). B is less optimistic than B′, so
ai,z is also preferred to ai,Mi for all ti ≤ c′Mi,z under B. At some point, this relationship is reversed,
because ai,Mi is always played, hence cMi,z must exist. Write si,Mi−1 − s′i,Mi−1 = cMi,w − c′Mi,z =
cMi,w − cMi,z + cMi,z − c′Mi,z. By definition 8, cMi,w − cMi,z ≥ 0, because si,Mi−1 = cMi,w implies
that ai,Mi is played right after ai,w, and so it must be that ai,Mi was preferred to ai,z for some lower
types (the argument is similar to Proposition 5). That is, cMi,z ≤ cMi,w. Since cMi,z − c′Mi,z ≥ v,
it must be that si,Mi−1 − s′i,Mi−1 ≥ v.
By induction hypothesis, suppose that si,`+1−s′i,`+1 ≥ v. The objective is to show that it implies
si,` − s′i,` ≥ v. Consider four cases.
Case 1: Action ai,` is played both under si and s′i. This case is similar the case of the largest
real cutoff, and the proof is identical.
Case 2: Action ai,` is played neither under si nor s′i. Then, si,` = si,`+1 and s
′
i,` = s
′
i,`+1. By
induction hypothesis, si,` − s′i,` ≥ v.
Case 3: Action ai,` is not played under si, but it is played under s′i. Then, si,` = cw,z for some
actions ai,w and ai,z such that z < ` < w, and s′i,` = c
′
`,x for some ai,x. For types ti ≥ cw,z, ai,w is
preferred to ai,` under B, and so is it under B′, because B′ is more optimistic than B. Since ai,`
is played under B′, there are also types at which ai,` is preferred to ai,w; so c′w,` must exist. To
show that cw,` exists, recall that for types ti ≥ cw,z, ai,w is preferred to ai,` under B. For types
ti ≤ c′`,x, ai,` is preferred to ai,w under B′, for otherwise ai,w would be preferred to ai,` for all types
above c′`,x. Thus, because B is less optimistic than B
′, ai,` must also be preferred to ai,w for types
ti ≤ c′`,x. Under B, there are types such that the preference between ai,` and ai,w goes both ways,
so cw,` exists. Write si,` − s′i,` = cw,z − c′`,x. Note that c′w,` ≥ c′`,x, because ` is played under s′i in
an open set of types above c′`,x (so it is only for larger types that ai,w will be preferred). Further,
note that cw,` ≤ cw,z, because ai,w is played under si in an open set of types above cw,z, hence ai,w
is preferred to ai,` for smaller types. As a result, si,` − s′i,` ≥ cw,` − c′w,`, and so si,` − s′i,` ≥ v.
Case 4: Action a` is played under si but it is not played under s′i. The argument is close to
case 3. Since ai,` is played under si, it must dominate ai,z < ai,` for some types; because beliefs B′
are more optimistic than B, ai,` must also dominate ai,z for those types. But ai,z is played under
s′i, and as a result, c
′
`,z exists. Likewise, ai,z dominates ai,` under B
′ for some types, because it is
played. For those types, it must also be the case under B, because B is less optimistic than B′. So
c`,z exists. 
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Proof. In supermodular games, recall that the largest (smallest) equilibrium coincide with the
largest (smallest) profile of rationalizable strategies. Consider the largest (smallest) equilibrium,
denoted by s (s), under beliefs (Fi, Gi), i = 1, . . . , n. At strategy profile s, i’s (fictitious) cutoff
between an and am satisfies∫
R
∑
γ
∆ui(γ, θ)gi(γ|θ, s−i, cn,m)fi(θ|cn,m)dθ = 0. (A.16)
Since beliefs (F ′i , G
′
i) are more optimistic than (Fi, Gi),∫
R
∑
γ
∆ui(γ, θ)g′i(γ|θ, s−i, cn,m)f ′i(θ|cn,m)dθ ≥ 0, (A.17)
because ∆ui is increasing in θ and γ. This implies that the (fictitious) cutoff between an and am
must be smaller under (F ′i , G
′
i) than (Fi, Gi). The proof will say how much smaller that fictitious
cutoff has to be under (F ′i , G
′
i). For s−i and ti, take any v ≥ 0 such that if∫
R
∑
γ
∆ui(γ, θ)gi(γ|θ, s−i, ti)fi(θ|ti)dθ = 0 (A.18)
holds, then ∫
R
∑
γ
∆ui(γ, θ)g′i(γ|θ, s−i, ti − v)f ′i(θ|ti − v)dθ > 0. (A.19)
If v satisfies (A.19), then ti − v cannot be the (fictitious) cutoff under (F ′i , G′i) (because ti − v is
too high). Look for a larger v (that is, a lower ti − v). It follows from the definition of optimism
and upper-confidence that∫
R
∑
γ
∆ui(γ, θ)g′i(γ|θ, s−i, ti − v)fi(θ − ω1 +Ki(v)|ti)dθ > 0 (A.20)
implies (A.19). After a change of variables, (A.20) is equivalent to∫
R
∑
γ
∆ui(γ, θ + ω1 −Ki(v))g′i(γ|θ + ω1 −Ki(v), s−i, ti − v)fi(θ|ti)dθ > 0. (A.21)
If (A.18) holds, then (A.21) is equivalent to∫
R
∑
γ
(∆ui(γ, θ + ω1 −Ki(v))−∆ui(γ, θ))g′i(γ|θ + ω1 −Ki(v), s−i, ti − v)fi(θ|ti)dθ
+
∫
R
∑
γ
∆ui(γ, θ)fi(θ|ti)(g′i(γ|θ + ω1 −Ki(v), s−i, ti − v)− gi(γ|θ, s−i, ti))dθ > 0. (A.22)
Consider each member of (A.22) successively and find a lower for this expression. Take the first
member. By definition of M∗,∫
R
∑
γ
(∆ui(γ, θ + ω1 −Ki(v))−∆ui(γ, θ))g′i(γ|θ + ω1 −Ki(v), s−i, ti − v)fi(θ|ti)dθ ≥∫
R
M∗(ω1 −Ki(v), ti)fi(θ|ti)dθ (A.23)
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Take the second member of (A.22). Note that
∑
γ≥γ
∆ui(γ, θ)(g′i(γ|θ + ω1 −Ki(v), s−i, ti − v)− gi(γ|θ, s−i, ti)) =
∑
γ≥γ
(G′i(σ(γ)|θ + ω1 −Ki(v), s−i, ti − v)−Gi(σ(γ)|θ, s−i, ti))(∆ui(γ, θ)−∆ui(σ(γ), θ)) (A.24)
For notational ease, Gi(τi) ∨Gi(τi − o(v)) is denoted G∗i (τi), and Gi(τi) ∧Gi(τi − o(v)) is denoted
G∗,i(τi). The same notation applies to the probability mass functions. Like (A.7), define
C∗(θ) = min
{
∆ui(σ(γ), θ)−∆ui(γ, θ)
σ(γ)− γ : γ ∈ Gi
}
(A.25)
to be the minimum amount of complementarities at state θ. Suppose first that Gi(τi − o(v)) ≥st
Gi(τi) for all τi. So w2(v) ≤ Γei [G′i(τi − o(v))] − Γei [Gi(τi)] for all τi. Since ∆ui is increasing in γ,
optimism implies that for all τi (so it is particularly true for the extremal rationalizable strategies
s−i and s−i), ∑
γ≥γ(G
′
i(σ(γ)|τi − o(v))−Gi(σ(γ)|τi))(∆ui(γ, θ)−∆ui(σ(γ), θ))
=
∑
γ≥γ(G
′
i(σ(γ)|τi − o(v))−G∗,i(σ(γ)|τi))(∆ui(γ, θ)−∆ui(σ(γ), θ))
≥ ∑γ≥γ(G′i(σ(γ)|τi − o(v))−G∗,i(σ(γ)|τi))(γ − σ(γ))C∗(θ)
= C∗(θ)
∑
γ γ(g
′
i(γ|τi − o(v))− g∗,i(γ|τi))
≥ C∗(θ)wi2(v)
Suppose now that Gi(τi − o(v)) 6≥st Gi(τi) for some τi. So w2(v) ≤ Γei [G′i(τi − o(v))] − Γei [G′i(τi −
o(v)) ∨Gi(τi)] for all τi. Then for all τi,∑
γ≥γ(G
′
i(σ(γ)|τi − o(v))−Gi(σ(γ)|τi))(∆ui(γ, θ)−∆ui(σ(γ), θ))
≥ ∑γ≥γ(G′i(σ(γ)|τi − o(v))−G∗i (σ(γ)|τi))(∆ui(γ, θ)−∆ui(σ(γ), θ))
≥ ∑γ≥γ(G′i(σ(γ)|τi − o(v))−G∗i (σ(γ)|τi))(γ − σ(γ))C∗(θ)
= C∗(θ)
∑
γ γ(g
′
i(γ|τi − o(v))− g∗i (γ|τi))
≥ C∗(θ)wi2(v)
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Putting this together with (A.23), we have that if (A.18) holds, then∫
R
M∗(θ, ω1 −Ki(v))fi(θ|ti)dθ −min
{∫
R
ω2(v)C∗(θ)fi(θ|ti)dθ,
∫
R
ω2(v)C∗(θ)fi(θ|ti)dθ
}
> 0
(A.26)
implies (A.19). Let M∗(ω1−Ki(v), ti) =
∫
RM∗(θ, ω1−Ki(v))fi(θ|ti)dθ, C∗(ti) =
∫
RC
∗(θ)fi(θ|ti)dθ
and C∗(ti) =
∫
RC∗(θ)fi(θ|ti)dθ. Hence, δ(B,B′,u) gives the infimum value of v such that (A.26) is
satisfied for all pair of actions, strategies of players −i, and player i. This means that cn,m−c′n,m ≥
d(B,B′,u) for all n and m. Proposition 6 completes the proof. 
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